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DEAN F. LUDDINGTON RETIREMENT 
TRUST, 
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C. DEAN LARSEN, an individual; 
BODENVEST LTD., a Utah Limited 
Partnership; EFF FUND, a Utah 
Limited Partnership; MENACOR, 
INC., a Utah Corporation; 
PETERSEN INVESTORS, a Utah 
General Partnership; FOOTHILL 
THRIFT, a Utah Corporation; 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 12, 
Defendants, Appellant, 
and Appellee. 
FOOTHILL THRIFT, now known as 
FOOTHILL FINANCIAL, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Counterclaimant, Cross 
Complainant, and 
Appellee, 
vs. 
DEAN F. LUDDINGTON, Trustee 
of the DEAN F. LUDDINGTON 
RETIREMENT TRUST; BODENVEST 
LTD., a Utah Limited Partner-
ship; EFF FUND, a Utah Limited 
Partnership; MENACOR, INC., 
a Utah Corporation; PETERSEN 
INVESTORS, a Utah General 
Partnership; and JOHN DOES 1 
through 12, 
Counter-Defendants, 
Cross-Defendants, and 
Appellant. 
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Appellee Foothill Thrift replies to the Brief of Appellant 
Bodenvest in Opposition to Appellee's Petition for Rehearing as 
follows: 
POINT I, 
FOOTHILL HAS NOT IMPROPERLY RAISED ISSUES FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Bodenvest's argument that Foothill has improperly raised for 
the first time in its Petition for Rehearing the issues of record 
and inquiry notice to Bodenvest;s limited partners of the prior 
Bodenvest transactions is not well taken. Foothill, of necessity, 
questioned this court's articulated understanding that the limited 
partners lacked knowledge of these prior Bodenvest transactions, a 
factual proposition advanced for the first time by this court in 
its decision in this appeal. Foothill raised these issues in its 
Petition for Rehearing to point out (1) the trial court made no 
finding that the limited partners of Bodenvest lacked knowledge, 
whether actual, or constructive of prior Bodenvest transactions 
and/or the Foothill Trust Deed; and (2) the facts in the record of 
the case would not support this court's conclusion that the limited 
partners lacked knowledge of the Foothill Trust Deed. Foothill did 
not address the issues of record and inquiry notice in its original 
brief because, at the time of the appeal, the trial court had made 
no finding that the limited partners lacked knowledge. 
Foothill did address these issues in its Petition for 
Rehearing because this court's decision on the appeal was based 
upon assumed "facts" which the trial court did not find, which 
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were not proven and which would contradict this court's long 
recognition of the legal doctrines of record notice and inquiry 
notice. Foothill felt compelled to respond and did so by filing 
the Petition for Rehearing now before this court. Under these 
circumstances Foothill committed no impropriety by raising these 
issues in its Petition for Rehearing. 
POINT II, 
BODENVEST, NOT FOOTHILL, HAD THE BURDEN BEFORE 
THE TRIAL COURT TO ESTABLISH LACK OF KNOWLEDGE 
BY THE LIMITED PARTNERS. 
Bodenvest argues in opposition to appellee's Petition for 
Rehearing that Foothill had the burden to establish that 
Bodenvest's partners were aware that Granada and Larsen were using 
partnership property to secure "their private debts." This is 
simply incorrect. Bodenvest expressly plead lack of knowledge as 
an affirmative defense. It is well-recognized that the party 
asserting an affirmative defense has the burden of proof as to 
every necessary element. See Messick v. PHD Trucking Svc., 615 
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1980); Whvte v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 1289 (Utah 
1976); Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931 (Utah 1975). 
At trial Foothill established, and the trial court found, that 
Bodenvest's general partner executed the Foothill Trust Deed. 
Foothill established and the trial court found that Larsen, as 
president of Granada, the general partner of Bodenvest, had 
authority, either actual or apparent, to bind Bodenvest in 
executing the trust deed in favor of Foothill. It was incumbent 
upon Bodenvest to raise and prove lack of knowledge by its 
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partners, actual or constructive, in order to establish its defense 
to the Foothill trust deed that Granada lacked authority to bind 
Bodenvest in executing the Trust Deed in favor of Foothill. 
Lack of knowledge was never established "as a matter of law." 
The trial court made no finding that the limited partners lacked 
knowledge of Granada's prior activities in pledging Bodenvest 
property to secure debts of either Bodenvest or Granada. In fact, 
Foothill did present evidence that the limited partners had 
sufficient information to charge them with knowledge of the 
activities of their general partner. The fact that the Peterson, 
Luddington and Foothill Trust Deeds were recorded was established 
at trial. The fact that partners of Bodenvest received K-l tax 
returns showing accrual of interest income was established by 
Foothill at trial. The fact that Bodenvest repeatedly loaned its 
monies to Granada or its other affiliates through the Bodenvest 
checking account, thus generating the interest income referenced 
above, was established by Foothill at trial. Only two of 
Bodenvest's partners testified that they lacked knowledge of 
Granada's actions prior to the loan by Foothill. The majority of 
limited partners did not testify. It was never established that 
Bodenvest's partners lacked knowledge of Granada's prior actions. 
Appellant complains at footnote 1 (page 5) of its Brief that 
proving lack of knowledge would have required it to "interrupt the 
medical practices of all of the partners of Bodenvest" so that they 
could testify at trial. The fundamental problem with this entire 
case is that Bodenvest's busy limited partners could not or would 
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not take the time to take an interest in their investment, whether 
by testifying at trial or by questioning income accruals reflected 
on K-l tax returns or by overseeing Dean Larsen or Granada as 
general partner of their partnership. If Bodenvest partners had 
bothered to take a little time to supervise partnership affairs, it 
is likely that they would have long ago discovered the pattern of 
transactions in which Granada and Larsen were engaged, which 
permitted Foothill, and undoubtedly others, to reasonably believe 
that Larsen's and Granada's actions were within the authority 
sanctioned by their partners. 
POINT III, 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AND NO FINDING OF ANY 
COLLUSION BETWEEN FOOTHILL AND GRANADA. 
Without stating why, appellant argues that the facts of the 
Gustafson case are substantially the same as this case. 
Appellants' contention that "it would not be wholly inappropriate" 
to describe Foothill's conduct as collusive (Brief, p. 13) lacks 
any support in the record whatsoever. It is ironic that Bodenvest 
makes this unsupported outrageous statement and in its next 
paragraph seeks sanctions against appellant. 
POINT IV. 
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER DID MAKE THE 
CERTIFICATION REQUIRED IN RULE 35. 
Appellant's final point is that " [alppellee's motion lacks the 
certificate required in Rule 35 that it is not asserted for delay" 
thus warranting sanctions against appellee. The required 
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certification was contained on page 15 of appellee's Petition for 
Rehearing. 
DATED this / b i-~:> day of June, 1993 M 
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Attorneys for Appellee, 
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